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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical: professional basketball
player Yao Ming (“Yao”) of the Houston Rockets gets the
“Twizzlers” candy logo temporarily tattooed on his right bicep.
Hershey Foods Corporation (“Hershey”), owner of the Twizzlers
candy and logo, is paying Yao $250,000 to wear the temporary
tattoo, which will naturally wear off in two weeks—after Yao has
played in several televised games, appeared on countless sports
highlight shows all over the country, and likely graced the back
cover of various newspapers.
Hershey is a direct competitor of Nestlé, an official corporate
sponsor of the National Basketball Association (“NBA”).1
Nevertheless, through its creative arrangement with Yao, Hershey
has effectively circumvented Nestlé’s exclusive contract with the
NBA, and has advertised its product in a variety of media for a
fraction of what it would likely cost to purchase one minute of
advertising during a national broadcast of an NBA game.
This type of marketing ploy, called tattoo advertising, has
already made a controversial appearance in the sporting world.
Beach volleyball players and skateboarders have worn tattoo
advertisements and skin patches.2 Boxers have been using tattoo
1
See generally Michael Futterman, Sports Tattoos Could Lead to Dollar Signs,
NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 19, 2001, at C1 (stating that Nestlé has paid several
million dollars to be the exclusive candy sponsor of the NBA).
2
Marathon runners, bodybuilders, and tennis players have expressed interest in
offering skin-space for sponsorship as well. Sam Walker, On Sports: This Skin for Rent,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2001, at W10. In addition, an Australian soccer club recently
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advertising to make extra money for several years.3 A certain
online gambling site has temporarily tattooed its internet address
across boxers’ backs for televised fights, despite resistance from
boxing regulators and television broadcasters.4 While no NBA
player has yet worn a tattoo advertisement, several players
considered it, and the NBA asserted that it will prohibit the
practice.5 In response, the NBA Players Association has stated it
believes tattoo advertising is permissible, and would likely file a
grievance with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) if
the NBA thwarts a tattoo advertising campaign.6
Before the NBA formally issues a blanket prohibition of tattoo
advertising to protect league and corporate sponsorships and
marketing agreements, does the league have an obligation to
consider the rights of the players? A ban on tattoo advertising
arguably restricts the player’s freedom of expression or other
personal liberty or privacy rights. As discussed above, some
boxers wear tattoo advertisements. NBA players wear all kinds of
visible tattoos on their arms and shoulders. And one player,
Shaquille O’Neal, even has a self-promoting “Superman” logo
permanently tattooed on his arm.7 The NBA apparently has not
expressed any concerns about these tattoos8—making a ban on
announced it was considering a sponsorship agreement under which players would have a
mobile telephone company’s logo temporarily tattooed on their arms. While the club
indicated that it intends to pursue the deal, the Australian Football League reportedly
“was not amused and said it had knocked the concept back when approached in the past.”
Rosanne Michie, Tattoo Idea is Crazy, Says AFL, SUNDAY HERALD SUN (Austl.), Dec. 19,
2004, at 9.
3
See Hilary Cassidy, Roll (Dice) with the Punches: When an Online Casino Sends a
Fighter into the Ring with its Ad Tattooed on His Back, He Upsets His Opponents, the
Boxing Community and ESPN, BRANDWEEK, Dec. 9. 2002, at 22.
4
Id.
5
Matthew Futterman, NBA Paints its Own Picture on Tattoo Ads—Corporate Logos
on Players Not Acceptable, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 21, 2001, at 067;
Matthew Futterman, NBA: Union Takes Wait-and-See on Tattoos, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Mar. 22, 2001, at http://www.fiftyrubies.com/New%20Jersey%20Online%20Star-Ledger%20Sports.htm.
6
See Charlene E.M. Wilson, Corporate Tattoos Present Problem for NBA, Mar. 23,
2001, at http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Articles%202001/NBATattoos.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2005).
7
Eric Immerman, Jenny Jumping into Lake Show, at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=1477699&type=page2Story (last modified Dec. 18, 2002).
8
See generally Futterman, supra note 1.
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tattoo advertising without a sound legal premise smack of
hypocrisy and paternalism.
In addition, the NBA Players
Association believes the league cannot unilaterally ban tattoo
advertisement, but rather must resolve the issue through collective
bargaining.9
Here, applying First Amendment protection to a purely
commercial form of expression like tattoo advertising would be a
dubious extension of the law10 and the First Amendment may have
little relevance to the NBA because the league is not a state actor.11
The NBA also has lucrative sponsorship agreements with
numerous corporations, allowing the sponsors to advertise in
basketball arenas, at NBA events and during television broadcasts
of NBA games.12 Various other companies pay television
networks millions of dollars for exclusive rights to advertise during
NBA game broadcasts.13 The NBA ostensibly selects sponsors in
an effort to protect the league’s image.
Renegade tattoo
advertisers peddling any variety of goods or services could take
advantage of the goodwill the NBA enjoys in the marketplace and
harm its image by giving the appearance that the advertisers or
their products are affiliated with the NBA.
This Article will explore the issue of tattoo advertising on NBA
players. Part I provides background information on tattoo
advertisers campaigns to date. Part II discusses ways in which
9

Walker, supra note 2.
See S.F. Arts & Ath., Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535
(1987) (stating that “[c]ommercial speech ‘receives a limited form of First Amendment
protection’” (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340
(1986))).
11
See generally id. at 543–44 (holding that Congressional grant of charter to United
States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) does not make the USOC a state actor); Goldberg
v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (arguing in dicta
that it is unlikely that the NBA is a government entity for First Amendment purposes);
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 425–26 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that
Congress’s grant of a federal antitrust exemption to Major League Baseball does not
make the league a state actor).
12
Stefan Fatsis & Suzanne Vranica, NBA’s Rapid Action Following Brawl Earns
Kudos from Major Advertisers, NAT’L POST (Can.), Nov. 24, 2004, at FP10; see Debbie
Arrington, Ad Nauseam: Sponsors Rethink Their Support of NBA, Players, DESERET
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 12, 2004, at D08; Futterman, supra note 1 (reporting that Nestlé
has paid millions to be the exclusive candy sponsor).
13
Fatsis & Vranica, supra note 12.
10
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tattoo advertisers could unfairly capitalize on the goodwill of the
NBA, and concludes that tattoo advertising is likely to confuse
viewers into believing that the tattoo advertiser has a sponsorship
agreement with, or is authorized by, the NBA. Part II also
analyzes the First Amendment implications of restricting players
from wearing tattoo advertisements. It argues that the NBA should
not be considered a state actor, and that tattoo advertising is not
protected speech. Finally, Part III considers whether the NBA can
unilaterally prohibit tattoo advertising, or whether such a
restriction must be collectively bargained with the players’ union.
The Article concludes that, under the National Labor Relations
Act, the NBA is not required to negotiate its stance on tattoo
advertising through collective bargaining. Tattoo advertising may
prove to be an interesting battle for the players and their lawyers,
but ultimately it would be a losing one.
I. THIS SKIN FOR RENT: THE HISTORY OF TATTOO ADVERTISING
ON ATHLETES
The furor over tattoo advertising began in September 2001
when boxer Bernard “The Executioner” Hopkins wore a temporary
tattoo on his back while defeating the favored Felix Trinidad.14
GoldenPalace.com, an online casino, paid Hopkins about $100,000
to have its internet address temporarily tattooed on his back in
large block letters.15 The Nevada Athletic Commission (NAC)
then stepped in and voted 5-0 to prohibit a second fighter, Clarence
“Bones” Adams, from wearing a temporary GoldenPalace.com
tattoo on his back during a fight against Paulie Ayala.16 The
NAC’s decision was based on three factors: (1) that the tattoos
could distract judges; (2) that the ink might get into the opponent’s
14

See Cassidy, supra note 3, at 22 (“The body art . . . generated a swirl of controversy
over the rights of boxers to control their images and a network’s ability to protect its
interests—while generating a roundhouse punch of publicity for the company.”); Walker,
supra note 2 (The henna tattoo in this first fight started coming off after Hopkins began
sweating during the fight. Nevertheless, GoldenPalace.com signed a long-term deal to
apply henna tattoos for subsequent fights).
15
Walker, supra note 2.
16
George Kimball, Boxing Notes; Tattoo Needle; Fighters Left Flat on Backs, BOSTON
HERALD, May 19, 2002, at B23.
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eyes; and (3) that tattoo advertisements are demeaning to the sport
of boxing.17 Adams sought a temporary restraining order against
the NAC, which a Clark County District Court granted.18 In
March 2002, the Clark County District Court granted a preliminary
injunction against the NAC, stating that while the Government
does have an interest in preventing the distraction of boxing judges
during a fight, distraction has not been shown and a banning of the
temporary markings does not materially advance the
Commission’s interest.19 The judge further held that “the ban was
a violation of the boxers’ First Amendment rights and therefore
could not be enforced.”20 Subsequently, “Bones” Adams and other
boxers have fought with temporary GoldenPalace.com tattoos on
their backs.21 Cash-strapped former celebrities Todd Bridges,
Danny Bonaduce, and Tonya Harding22 also jumped into the tattoo
advertising fray, each sporting GoldenPalace.com tattoos on their
backs during Fox Television’s “Celebrity Boxing” show.23
According to GoldenPalace.com, the celebrities were each paid in
the “low five figures.”24 Over fifteen million viewers in the United
States saw the program on Fox, and visitors to the

17

Id.
Press Release, GoldenPalace.com, GoldenPalace.com to Help Fund Retired Boxers
Foundation (July 10, 2002), at http://goldenpalaceevents.com/sports/retired01.php
(hereinafter Golden Palace Press Release). According to GoldenPalace.com’s attorney,
“the judge found that the ban was an improper ‘ad hoc’ regulation, and that it was an
‘overbroad’ infringement of free speech in violation of the First Amendment.” Id.
19
Adams v. Nev. Athletic Comm’n, No. 02-A-446674-C, 2002 WL 1967500 (Nev.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 6, 2002).
20
See Golden Palace Press Release, supra note 18; W.H. Stickney Jr., Body Language
All the Rage, HOUS. CHRON., June 2, 2002, at 4.
21
See Golden Palace Press Release, supra note 18. GoldenPalace.com tattooed over
thirty fighters between September 19, 2001 and July 10, 2002. Id. According to one
sports commentator, “Happily, for true boxing fans, Paulie Ayala tattooed Bones’ face
and belly with his gloves [during their boxing match].” Mike O’Callaghan, Smile, Don’t
Fight, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 15, 2002, at 19.
22
Of “Diff’rent Strokes,” “The Partridge Family,” and figure-skater-who-hired-ahitman-to-smash-Nancy-Kerrigan’s-kneecap fame, respectively. James Poniewozik,
Celebrity Boxing is a Stiff, TIME MAG., May 14, 2002, available at
http://www.time.com/time/columnist/poniewozik/article/0,9565,217249,00.html.
23
Michael McCarthy, Ad Tattoos Get under Some People’s Skin, USA TODAY, Apr. 4,
2002, at B03.
24
Id.
18
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GoldenPalace.com web site reportedly rose 200% in the twentyfour hour period following the show.25
While the boxers pocketed the money, ESPN fumed.26 In the
spring of 2002, the sports network announced that it would
prohibit fighters from wearing temporary tattoos in fights shown
on its ESPN or ESPN2 channels.27 It received an assurance from
junior middleweight Kassim Ouma, as well as his manager, that
the boxer would not wear a tattoo during his May 10, 2002 fight
against Jason Papillion.28 However, come fight time, Ouma and
Papillion both revealed GoldenPalace.com tattoos on their backs.29
ESPN responded by fining the fight promoter $10,000 and
threatening never to broadcast an Ouma fight on its network
again.30 Fox Sports also reportedly told promoters it would not
allow tattoo advertising on its boxing programs.31
A. Tattoo Advertising and the NBA
Rumors that NBA players planned to wear tattoo
advertisements circulated even before boxers began sporting them.
A New York City marketing executive, Dakkan Abbe, contacted
several NBA players in March 2001 to propose that they wear

25

Id. GoldenPalace.com has paid “streakers” at sports events to tattoo their backs as
well. Most famously, a man wearing nothing but a temporary tattoo on his chest ran onto
the field at the Super Bowl—the National Football League’s championship game—in
February 2004. Super Ads?, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at 14. The web site reportedly saw
an immediate 380% jump in web traffic. Id. More recently, GoldenPalace.com paid
$28,000 in an eBay.com online auction for a partially eaten, ten-year-old grilled cheese
sandwich with what the seller claimed was a likeness of the Virgin Mary visible on the
toasted bread. Sandwich with Image of Mary Draws $28,000; Grilled Cheese Sold on
eBay Sparks Other Lookalike Items, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at 4.
26
Liz Mullen, Boxer’s Tattoo Gets Underneath ESPN’s Skin, STREET & SMITH’S
SPORTS BUS. J., Aug. 5, 2002, available at http://goldenpalaceevents.com/sports/tattoo01.php.
27
See id.
28
Bernard Fernandez, Cease Fire, But Watch Your Back, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 27,
2002, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/dailynews/2002/08/27/sports/3945726.htm?1c; see also Bob Raissman, TV’s Fight Foe: Tattoos, Inc., N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, May 14, 2002, at 53.
29
Fernandez, supra note 28.
30
Id.
31
Raissman, supra note 28.
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tattoo advertisements.32 Abbe reportedly planned a sneak attack
for Sunday, April 1, 2001, when players were to wear tattoo ads in
games between the Orlando Magic and the Detroit Pistons, the
Indiana Pacers and the Philadelphia 76ers, and the New York
Knicks and the Los Angeles Lakers.33 When the NBA heard about
the plan, it prohibited tattoo ads on the grounds that players are not
allowed to advertise products on the playing court.34 Abbe initially
had Rasheed Wallace, then a forward for the Portland Trailblazers,
interested, but Wallace later rejected the idea.35 According to
Wallace’s agent, “His decision had nothing to do with the league’s
position. He decided not to do it because he didn’t want to detract
from his current tattoos. He didn’t want to become a billboard.”36
Abbe claimed the NBA scared players off.37
The Players Association decided to bide its time to see if a
player wearing a tattoo would be fined or suspended by the
league.38 No player has taken this risk, so the issue remains
hypothetical and the NBA’s stated position remains untested.39

32

Roscoe Nance, Marketer Hopes NBA Players Will Agree to Temporary Ad Tattoos,
USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2001, at C06.
33
Fred Robinson, Tattoos Used as Advertisement Not Welcome, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Apr. 1, 2001, at Sports p.2.
34
Id.
35
Nance, supra note 32.
36
Id.
37
Adam Rubin, Tattoos Used as Ads Have Drawn NBA’s Ire, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar.
22, 2001, at 80.
38
See Futterman, supra note 5.
39
Id. Richard “Rip” Hamilton of the Detroit Pistons came closest to challenging the
rule when he had his hair braided to match the tread pattern of a Goodyear tire. He
debuted the hairdo on January 31, 2005 in a game against the New York Knicks.
Goodyear paid Hamilton an undisclosed amount of money—and gave him a new set of
tires—to wear his hair in the tire tread pattern for a week. Goodyear Endorsement Deal
Goes Straight to Piston Player’s Head, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 3, 2005, at E02; Scott
Soshnick, Pistons’ Hamilton Heads Up Tire Ad: Goodyear Pays Detroit Star to Wear His
Hairstyle Like Its Automobile Tread, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.detnews.com/2005/autosinsider/0502/01/C01-76155.htm.
A Goodyear
spokesman announced that the company chose Hamilton because “the way he plays fits
nicely with the product—confident maneuvering, handles well in all conditions.”
Overtime, FT. WAYNE J. GAZETTE (Ind.), Feb. 8, 2005, at 4B. Hamilton’s tread-head (and
Goodyear’s puns) received mixed reviews from the public. Dwain Price, Rudy T Exits
Amid Reminders that He’s Truly One of the Good Guys, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Feb. 6, 2005, at C6. The NBA did not comment publicly.
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B. Current NBA Rules Potentially Applicable to Tattoo
Advertising
NBA players face a wholly different set of issues than do
boxers with respect to tattoo advertising: boxers compete
individually, have no “boss,” are not part of a league,40 and for the
most part negotiate their contracts on a fight-by-fight basis.41 The
sport is governed by individual state boxing commissions.42 On
the other hand, NBA players compete in teams under the
leadership of coaches, a general manager, and a team owner.43
Players are members of a league, receive regular salaries, and often
have performance-based incentive clauses included in multi-year
contracts.44 All NBA players are members of a players’ union and
are subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and
NBA Rules.45
Neither the NBA’s CBA nor the Uniform Player Contract
The NBA
(“UPC”) directly addresses tattoo advertising.46
primarily bases its tattoo ad ban on provisions that grant the NBA
Commissioner the authority to enforce the “best interests” of the
league.47 For example, a UPC provision on player conduct states:
“The Player agrees . . . not to do anything that is materially
detrimental or materially prejudicial to the best interests of the
Team or the League.”48 Similarly, a UPC clause governing player
40

See Jioni Palmer, Ready for a House Fight, NEWSDAY, Jan. 9, 2005, at A08.
Jack Newfield, Teamsters Ring Bell, N.Y. SUN, May 7, 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.boxersunion.org/news/bn_030507_1.htm.
42
Palmer, supra note 40; see also Tim Lueckenhoff, Understanding the Association of
Boxing Commissions, at http://www.secondsout.com/Ringside/business.cfm?ccs=356&cs=9836 (discussing the business of boxing) (last viewed Mar. 14, 2005).
43
Nat’l
Basketball
Players
Ass’n,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
at
http://www.nbpa.com/aboutus/nbpafaq.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005); see Official
Rules of the NBA, Rule No. 3-Players, Substitutes and Coaches, available at
http://www.nba.com/analysis/rules_index.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
44
NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VII, § 3, http://www.nbpa.com/cba/cba.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
45
Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, supra note 43; see also Official Rules of the NBA,
supra note 43.
46
See generally NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Exhibit A, NBA Uniform
Player Contract [hereinafter NBA UPC], http://www.nbpa.com/cba/exhibits/exhibitA.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
47
Id. § 5(b).
48
Id.
41
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promotional activities provides: “The Player agrees that . . . he will
not . . . sponsor commercial products without the written consent
of the Team, which shall not be withheld except in the reasonable
interests of the Team or the NBA.”49 Further, the CBA provision
on player uniforms is arguably broad enough to apply to tattoo
advertisements, stating:
During any NBA game or practice, including warm-up
periods and going to and from the locker room to the
playing floor, a player shall wear only the Uniform as
supplied by his Team. For purposes of the preceding
sentence only, “Uniform” means all clothing and other
items (such as kneepads, wristbands and headbands, but not
including Sneakers) worn by a player during an NBA game
or practice. ‘Sneakers’ means athletic shoes of the type
worn by players while playing an NBA game.50
Finally, the NBA Constitution, which is incorporated into the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, authorizes the league
Commissioner to fine “[a]ny Player who gives, makes, issues,
authorizes or endorses any statement having, or designed to have,
an effect prejudicial or detrimental to the best interests of
basketball or of the Association or of a Member or its
Team . . . .”51

49

Id. § 13(b).
NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 44, art. XXXVII (“Group
Licensing Rights”), § 3.
51
NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Exhibits, Excerpt from NBA Constitution, §
35(c), http://www.nbpa.com/cba/exhibits/exhibitA-excerpt.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2005). Two successive provisions of the NBA Constitution also give the Commissioner
broad power to fine or suspend players for misconduct. Section 35(d) states:
If in the opinion of the Commissioner any other act or conduct of a Player at or
during an Exhibition, Regular Season, or Playoff game has been prejudicial to
or against the best interests of the Association or the game of basketball, the
Commissioner shall impose upon such Player a fine . . . or may order for a time
the suspension of any such Player . . . or he may order both such fine and
suspension.
Section 35(e) states: “The Commissioner shall have the power to suspend for a definite or
indefinite period, or to impose a fine . . . or inflict both such suspension and fine upon
any Player who, in his opinion, shall have been guilty of conduct . . . that is prejudicial or
detrimental to the Association.”
50
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Presumably, the NBA Commissioner could decide that tattoo
advertising is detrimental to the best interests of the league if such
advertisements conflict with league sponsors or anger networks
televising NBA games. Nevertheless, for Dakkan Abbe, the
marketing executive, the controversy boils down to free speech.52
For athletes like boxer Kassim Ouma, wearing a tattoo ad means
added income.53 But for ESPN and the NBA, tattoo ads represent
lost revenue and strained relations with league sponsors and loyal
advertisers.54
II. PROHIBITING TATTOO ADVERTISING
The NBA has used the “best interests” language in the CBA to
impose fines and suspensions on players, coaches, and even team
owners who criticize the league or the officials during media
interviews.55 Those restrictions, however, are arguably more
justifiable than a ban on tattoo advertising. Criticizing game
52
According to Abbe, “How can the NBA mandate what goes on your skin? . . . To me,
it’s no different than a sneaker contract.” Elliot Harris, Almost Famous; NBA Wants to
Can this Marketing Plan, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 26, 2001, at 93. Further, Abbe believes
there is a cultural divide between NBA executives and NBA players, such that “[t]he
league has freaked out over the issue of tattoos. If they’re uncomfortable with tattoos,
they have to come to terms with it. . . . [The NBA] would like everyone to be like
Michael Jordan, no tattoos, never say anything controversial, sell the right products.”
Robinson, supra note 33 (alterations in original).
53
According to Ouma, “If I can make a little extra money by putting an ad on my
back, . . . it’s nobody’s business except for mine.” Raissman, supra note 28. NBA player
Kendall Gill agreed in 2002: “I’d do it for the right price. . . . This is a business. You’ve
got to take advantage of your opportunities.” Tom Verducci, The Rites of Spring: The
Only Ones Who Need Preseason Training are the Fans, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 18,
2002, at 25.
54
According to an ESPN spokesman:
What’s to stop a fighter from coming in the ring with Budweiser on his
back? . . . You’re Miller and you’re sponsoring the entire show and someone is
in the ring for thirty minutes with “Budweiser” on his back. Is Miller going to
continue to pay ESPN to support the show with this stuff going on?
Kimball, supra note 16.
55
Geoffrey C. Arnold, Raw’sheed Rasheed Wallace Cares, Just Not About Fans’
Feelings or the NBA, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 11, 2003, at D01. The NBA also has a
mandatory suspension policy for players who leave the team bench area during a fight
between players, regardless of whether or not the player leaving the bench contributes to
the fight. The league may also fine the player up to $20,000 for the infraction. Rod
Beaton, New Wave of Brawls Concerns Baseball, USA TODAY, June 23, 2003, at C8.
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officials in the media casts doubt on the integrity of the game,
personally insults officials, and unduly antagonizes or intimidates
officials in future games, thereby harming the integrity of the
league. However, tattoo advertising would not typically harm
anyone directly involved in the game of basketball.
A much more viable claim by the NBA would be rooted in the
financial harm to the league and its business partners, resulting
from infringement on intellectual property rights.
A. False Advertising and Unfair Competition
Tattoo advertising can best be compared to what is known as
“ambush marketing”—a practice whereby companies attempt to
make the consumer think their product or service is somehow
affiliated with a popular sporting event or league.56 The “ambush
marketer’s” goal is to capitalize on the goodwill of the sport,
league, or event without receiving authorization from the event
organizer.57 Common examples include giving away free tickets to
an event through sweepstakes or contests, sponsoring individual
teams or athletes, buying commercial time prior to or during event
broadcasts, or flying a banner over an outdoor stadium.58
Similarly, the company employing an athlete to wear a tattoo
advertisement avoids paying advertising and sponsorship fees to

56

See Lori L. Bean, Note, Ambush Marketing: Sports Sponsorship Confusion and the
Lanham Act, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1995).
57
Id.; J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 27:66 (4th ed. 2003).
58
See Bean, supra note 56, at 1100, 1103, 1105. One example includes the 1992
Winter Olympic Games, during which Visa paid the International Olympic Committee
(“IOC”) $20 million for the right to serve as the official credit card of the Olympic
Games. However, American Express bought substantial advertising time on the major
television networks. While American Express did not use the Olympic logo or name, it
made generic references to “winter fun and games.” Id. at 1103. Another example is
from the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Converse was an official
sponsor of the Games, but Nike ran a concurrent ad campaign with an “I Love L.A.”
theme. Id. at 1104. Yet another example is a contest Pepsi promoted in 1990 called the
“Diet Pepsi $4,000,000 Pro Hockey Playoff Pool.” Id. at 1108. Pepsi ran an extensive
advertising campaign for the contest during the National Hockey League (“NHL”)
Stanley Cup Playoffs, but never used the name or logo of the NHL. Coca-Cola was the
NHL’s official sponsor. Id. at 1108.
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the league or to the television broadcaster.59 Yet that company
benefits by reaching large audiences watching NBA games on
television. While such a practice may seem unethical or
underhanded, it is—in its pure form—entirely legal.60 Problems
could arise, however, where consumers are deceived or confused
into thinking that the event organizer endorses the ambush
marketer, or that the two entities have some sort of relationship.61
This is where the “victim,” such as the NBA, might be able to turn
to the Lanham Act to assert a false advertising claim.62
1. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
In drafting the federal trademark statute, and § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act in particular, Congress had a dual intent: (1) to protect
trademark owners from having their marks misappropriated by
others,63 and (2) to protect consumers, so that they “may be
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which
it asks for and wants to get.”64 Thus, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
holds liable:
(1) Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device . . . or any false designation of

59

See Stephen M. McKelvey, Commercial “Branding”: The Final Frontier of False
Start for Athletes’ Use of Temporary Tattoos as Body Billboards, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS
OF SPORT 1, 18 (2003).
60
According to one commentator:
The difficulty with ambush marketing is that the law is on the side of the
ambushers. Purely defined, ambush marketing does not involve counterfeiting
or the illegal use of trademarks, tradenames or symbols. Companies simply
develop a creative advertising campaign around the event, never use the event
logo, trademark or tradename and capitalize by association with the event
without paying for official sponsor status.
Robert N. Davis, Ambushing the Olympic Games, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 423, 430
(1996).
61
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2002).
62
See generally id. § 1125.
63
Bean, supra note 56, at 1111 (citing Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Rep. on S. 1883,
S. Rep. No. 100-515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5577, 5580).
64
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274).
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origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another
person . . . .
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion,
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
goods, services, or commercial activities . . . .65
Notably, the Act does not require that the confusing or
misleading “word, term, name, symbol, or device” be
trademarked.66 The Act can be used to target a wide range of false
or misleading advertising, and not just misrepresentation of an
existing mark.67
Therefore, were Twizzlers to launch a tattoo advertising
campaign on the biceps of NBA players, the NBA or its sponsor,
Nestlé, could bring a claim under § 43(a) against Twizzlers and its
parent company, Hershey Foods.68 The NBA or Nestlé could
claim likelihood of confusion—not between the Twizzlers and
NBA/Nestlé marks, but rather “confusion [or deception] as to the
affiliation . . . or sponsorship, or approval”69 of Twizzlers’ product
by the NBA or Nestlé.70 The cause of action would require
proving the following six elements:
65

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
See Bean, supra note 56, at 1111 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)).
67
Id.
68
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
69
See id.
70
Tattoo advertising can also be compared to virtual advertising—whereby advertisers
superimpose computer-generated advertisements into the scenery in sports broadcasts so
that the advertisement is visible to television viewers, but not to those attending the game.
According to one commentator:
[I]t is arguable that sports venues which do not grant athletic teams or
television broadcasters approval to place virtual ads in the venue may have
standing to bring § 43(a) claims because the ads: 1) falsely suggest that the
66
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(1) defendant has made a statement about a product which is
false, misleading, or is likely to cause confusion;
(2) the statement was made in a commercial or promotional
context (in connection with goods or services);
(3) the advertised goods travel in or affect interstate
commerce;
(4) a possibility of deception of a substantial segment of the
target audience exists;
(5) the deception is likely to affect purchasing decisions
(materiality); and
(6) there is a likelihood that plaintiff will be injured as a
result of the ad.71
While the first element would be most difficult to prove, it is
important to note that the Lanham Act does not target only literally
false representations.72 Rather, the Act is designed to protect
consumers as to source, origin, or sponsorship of a product or
service.73
a) Likelihood of Confusion
In order to show that a defendant tattoo advertiser’s use of a
word or symbol “is likely to cause confusion,” the NBA would
venues endorse or are affiliated with the advertised products; and 2) the virtual
ads negatively affect the venues’ business of selling ad space on venue
property. In addition, a sponsor forced to compete with virtual advertisements
may have standing to assert § 43(a) claims where: 1) a virtual ad is misleading
because the public perceives that the virtual ad is physically in place at the
sports venue and is associated with the venue; and 2) the virtual ad causes
commercial injury to the sponsor by reducing the value of the sponsor’s ad at
the park.
Theresa A. McEvilly, Comment, Virtual Advertising in Sports Venues & The Federal
Lanham Act § 43(a): Revolutionary Technology Creates Controversial Advertising
Medium, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 603, 619 (1998).
71
Id. at 619–20 (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 27:13); see also Johnson &
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 19 F.3d
125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994) (rejecting likelihood of confusion claim where consumer surveys
did not prove that a substantial number of consumers were misled).
72
See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir.
1978).
73
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125.

VUKELJ

522

6/2/2005 2:45 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:507

need to conduct a traditional likelihood of confusion analysis.74
Courts have articulated a multi-factor test for likelihood of
confusion:
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark and the
alleged infringing mark;
(2) the strength of the owner’s mark;
(3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the
care and attention expected of consumers when making a
purchase;
(4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark
without evidence of actual confusion arising;
(5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark;
(6) the evidence of actual confusion;
(7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed
through the same channels of trade and advertised through
the same media;
(8) the extent to which the targets of the parties’ sales efforts
are the same;
(9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers
because of the similarity of function . . . .75
For purposes of an ambush marketing case, factors four
through nine are the most relevant. With respect to factors four
and six, the NBA could present evidence of actual confusion
among viewers that defendant’s mark was actually endorsed or
sponsored by the NBA. For example, this evidence could take the
form of consumer surveys showing that consumers thought
Twizzlers was an officially endorsed snack of the NBA, and not
endorsed merely by the player wearing the tattoo advertisement. A
74

MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 27:18.
[U]nder the Lanham Act [§ 43(a)] the ultimate test is whether the public is
likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks. . . . Whether
we call the violation infringement, unfair competition or false designation of
origin, the test is identical—is there a “likelihood of confusion”?
Id. (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir.
1979)).
75
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983).
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showing that consumers believe the NBA approves of the player’s
on-court endorsement of the product, or that the tattoo
advertisement harms the league’s reputation, could be enough to
show confusion.76 While evidence of actual confusion could be
highly persuasive in the NBA’s favor, courts recognize that
showing actual confusion is difficult, especially where a plaintiff is
trying to enjoin a defendant from a marketing practice.77 If the
NBA acts quickly enough, there may not be time for actual harm
or confusion to take hold.78
The fifth factor—the intent of the defendant in adopting the
mark—would likely weigh in favor of the NBA. The tattoo
advertiser clearly undertakes the campaign in order to expose its
mark to a large audience via NBA telecasts. Evidence that the
defendant intended to make consumers think that its product is an
official sponsor of the NBA could be especially helpful for the
NBA. The league would want to show to the greatest extent
possible that the defendant tattoo advertiser was trying to capitalize
on the goodwill surrounding the NBA name and logo, and the
goodwill of those names and marks associated with the NBA as
official sponsors.79

76

See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205
(2d Cir. 1979).
77
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(“‘[I]t is black letter law that actual confusion need not be shown to prevail under the
Lanham Act, since actual confusion is very difficult to prove and the Act requires only a
likelihood of confusion as to source.’”) (quoting Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986)).
78
The example of a Twizzlers tattoo advertising campaign especially lends itself to
confusion among consumers. The average basketball fan probably does not know which
company manufactures Twizzlers. One might assume, when seeing a Twizzlers logo
tattooed on a player’s arm, that Twizzlers is produced by Nestlé, the NBA’s official
sponsor.
79
Goodwill is a business value that reflects the basic human propensity to continue
doing business with a seller who has offered goods and services that the customer likes
and has found adequate to fulfill his needs. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d
1109, 1122 (8th Cir. 1999). According to one commentator: “Goodwill is not to be
simply equated with reputation. It includes, but connotes more than, good credit,
honesty, fair name and reliability. . . . Because goodwill is merely a concept, it requires
perceptible symbols, e.g., trademarks and trade names, for its survival.” LOUIS ALTMAN,
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 1:11 (4th ed.
2001) (citations omitted).
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Factors seven, eight, and nine of the likelihood of confusion
analysis could also weigh in the NBA’s favor. The signage and
logos of the NBA’s official sponsors, as well as those of tattoo
advertisers, would be seen through the same medium—during
basketball telecasts potentially viewed by a national audience.80
As such, the targets of the advertising are the same. Finally, if the
consumer is aware that the NBA has numerous endorsement
contracts with goods and services providers, the consumer could
reasonably assume that a mark displayed during a basketball game
is an official sponsor of the NBA or has some endorsement from
the league or a specific team.
b) Other Elements of a § 43(a) Cause of Action
After showing likelihood of confusion, the NBA still must
show that: (a) the defendant’s misleading or confusing use of its
tattoo advertisement was made in a commercial or promotional
context; (b) the advertised goods travel in or affect interstate
commerce; (c) a possibility of deception of a substantial segment
of the target audience exists; (d) the deception is likely to affect
purchasing decisions; and (e) there is a likelihood that plaintiff will
be injured as a result of the tattoo advertisement.81

80

See MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Sprint Commun. Co., No. 94 CIV. 1051, 1994 WL
97097 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1994). In this case, MasterCard sought to enjoin Sprint from
distributing calling cards bearing the 1994 World Cup Soccer Tournament logo.
MasterCard had signed an exclusive agreement with the World Cup as a provider of
“card-based payment and account access device[s]” bearing the World Cup mark. Id. at
*1. Even though Sprint had rights to use the World Cup logo as a result of signing on as
the official long-distance telephone carrier of the World Cup, and even though the calling
card did not have a magnetic stripe, the court enjoined Sprint from distributing calling
cards with the World Cup logo because of the likelihood of confusion between the Sprint
calling card and the MasterCard credit card. See generally id. Where a league sponsor
and the tattoo advertiser are competitors, the NBA or an official sponsor could use the
MasterCard case to argue that because the sponsor has exclusive game time advertising
rights for a particular product, any other advertising in an NBA arena, or shown during an
NBA telecast, is likely to confuse viewers by making them think there is an association
between the tattoo advertiser and the NBA or television network. The analogy is limited,
however, by the fact that unlike a tattoo advertising case, MasterCard and Sprint both
incorporated the World Cup mark into their products, thereby increasing the likelihood of
confusion.
81
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
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The commercial nature of tattoo advertising is obvious. The
“interstate commerce” requirement is also easy to satisfy.82 Even
if a local company that did business in only one state paid a player
to wear a tattoo advertisement, its goods or services would be
advertised in multiple television markets in two or more states, and
thus the tattoo would be found likely to “affect” interstate
commerce.83
The possibility of deception would have been addressed, in
part, through the likelihood of confusion analysis. This element
would require a showing by the NBA that the average NBA
viewer, when seeing a tattoo advertisement on a player’s arm,
would assume that there was a relationship between the advertiser
and the NBA.84 Presumably, an association with the NBA is
meant to affect purchasing decisions, such that NBA fans will buy
a product endorsed by the league.
Finally, the NBA could show two forms of injury: (1) breach of
exclusive rights sponsorship contracts with legitimate sponsors, or
(2) harm to the NBA’s reputation by association with the tattoo
advertiser.85 Under the first form of injury, the NBA could suffer
monetary losses as a result of legitimate sponsors who, angered by
the tattoo advertising campaign, might abandon their agreements
82

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
See, e.g., id. at 125 (stating that even local activity of growing wheat on a private
farm falls under the Commerce Clause as substantially affecting interstate commerce
because such activity influences price of wheat in the overall wheat market); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (holding that travel,
regardless of the nature of the trip, affects interstate commerce, and thus racial
discrimination by a motel, which deters travelers, can be regulated under the Commerce
Clause); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1957) (explaining
that the business of professional football affects interstate commerce).
84
See, e.g., Zelinsky v. Columbia 300 Inc., 335 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding
that competitor’s use of trademarked bowling balls caused actual confusion); Mattel Inc.
v. Robarb’s Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 487, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that defendant’s
collectible car display caused “substantial confusion” with plaintiff’s Hot Wheels cars).
85
See, e.g., Hospitality Int’l Inc. v. Mahtani, No. 2:97CV87, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16445, at **64–65 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 1998) (holding that defendant’s use of exclusive
mark of Plaintiff was a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) and plaintiff was entitled to
the remedies provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that defendant damaged
plaintiff’s reputation where actresses in defendant’s pornographic film were shown
wearing uniforms similar to those normally associated with plaintiff).
83
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with the NBA because of a breach of exclusivity rights. This form
of injury would be most likely where the tattoo advertiser is a
direct competitor of an official NBA sponsor. The second form of
injury could apply whether or not the tattoo advertiser directly
competes with an NBA sponsor. Courts have stated that harm to
reputation is an actionable form of injury.86 The NBA could claim
that the tattoo advertiser, simply by associating itself with the
league, is casting a negative shadow upon the league. However,
this would not apply to an innocuous product like Twizzlers.
2. The Tattoo Advertiser’s Defense
The tattoo advertiser could defend on the grounds that there is
no likelihood of confusion between its mark and that of the NBA.
There is no law against aggressive marketing, and no precedent
exists for holding a marketer liable for this type of activity. As one
commentator has stated, “The difficulty [for sporting event
organizers] with ambush marketing is that the law is on the side of
the ambushers. Purely defined, ambush marketing does not
involve counterfeiting or the illegal use of trademarks, tradenames
or symbols.”87 It could be argued that ambush marketing—in
whatever form it is carried out—is in fact good for consumers. It
informs them of more available products and services, and denies
the granting of an advertising monopoly in a forum that should be
open to more than one advertiser. Rather than confusing the
consumer, it can expose the consumer to a greater number of
products. The tattoo advertisement is not replacing or displacing
an official sponsor’s ad. Rather, it is merely adding to the swirl of
marketing that already exists in professional sports.

86

See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., 604 F.2d at 205 (“The trademark laws are
designed not only to prevent consumer confusion but also to protect ‘the synonymous
right of a trademark owner to control his product’s reputation.’”) (quoting James
Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976)).
87
Davis, supra note 60, at 430. But see MCCARTHY, supra note 57, § 27:66 (stating that
“[i]n the event a misleading impression is created, a violation of § 43(a) can be triggered”
by an ambush marketing campaign).
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The only case thus far directly addressing ambush advertising
is National Hockey League v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd.88 As a
decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia (Canada), it
carries no weight in the United States, but it could indicate how
U.S. courts are likely to rule on a tattoo advertising case. The case
involved a promotional contest Pepsi ran in Canada, called the
“Diet Pepsi $4,000,000 Pro Hockey Playoff Pool.”89 The contest
was heavily advertised during the 1990 National Hockey League
(“NHL”) Stanley Cup Playoffs, and Pepsi obtained the “right to be
the exclusive advertiser of soft drinks during the broadcast of all
‘Hockey Night in Canada’ games” televised by the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation.90 Coca-Cola had entered into a $2.6
million agreement with the NHL in the spring of 1989 to serve as
an official league sponsor, but it did not obtain rights to advertise
during NHL game broadcasts in Canada.91 Pepsi avoided using the
NHL logo or name, instead adopting a generic phrase, “Pro
Hockey Playoff Pool.”92
The NHL claimed that “the Contest and particularly the
television advertisements . . . [were] likely to convey to the public
a false impression that the N.H.L. and its members approved,
authorized, endorsed, or were in some manner associated with the
Contest, and thereby, the defendant’s products.”93 Further, the
NHL asserted, “‘Pro Hockey Playoff’ could only have been
intended to be a reference to the Stanley Cup playoff series . . .
[and the contest] involved an infringement of [the NHL’s]
registered trade marks or, alternatively, was an unlawful
interference with their business relations with Coke.”94
Pepsi acknowledged that it purposely tried to gain “the greatest
possible commercial advantage from the publicity the defendant’s
88
92 D.L.R. 4th 349 (B.C. 1992); see also Davis, supra note 60, at 431–34 (discussing
the British Columbia Supreme Court decision in Nat’l Hockey League); Bean, supra note
56, at 1108–09 (also discussing Nat’l Hockey League).
89
Nat’l Hockey League, 92 D.L.R. 4th at 352–57.
90
Davis, supra note 60, at 432–33 (quoting Nat’l Hockey League, 92 D.L.R. 4th at
354).
91
Id. at 432.
92
Id.
93
See generally Nat’l Hockey League, 92 D.L.R. 4th at 356.
94
Id. at 356–57.
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products would receive during the Stanley Cup playoffs,” and that
its contest “intended to refer to the N.H.L. teams.”95 However,
Pepsi claimed it was not attempting to indicate that its products
were “in any way approved, authorized, or endorsed by or
associated with the plaintiffs.”96 Pepsi also denied infringement of
the NHL’s marks and denied interference with the NHL’s business
relationships. “The Contest was, they submitted, nothing more
than an aggressive but legitimate marketing campaign.”97
The NHL provided survey evidence of consumer impressions
that Pepsi was somehow affiliated with the NHL, but the court
found the plaintiff’s evidence unconvincing.98 Ultimately, the
court held:
Certainly, the [NHL]-Coke agreement obligates [the NHL],
so far as it is able, to protect the rights of Coke from
‘ambush marketing.’ Such an obligation cannot, however,
impose on a third party a duty to refrain from engaging in
advertising its products in a manner which, although
aggressive, is not, by the law of Canada, unlawful.99
The Canadian court, therefore, refused to hold Pepsi liable.100
Tattoo advertisers may also benefit from the fact that players
are already allowed to sign independent endorsement deals—
perhaps making tattoo advertising merely a new, aggressive
advertising technique in the existing scheme of player
Further, certain Major League Baseball
endorsement.101

95

Id. at 357.
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 360–65.
99
Id. at 369.
100
Id. at 372.
101
Despite the NBA’s exclusive sponsorship agreement with Coca-Cola, player
Shaquille O’Neal has had an endorsement deal with Pepsi. According to one
commentator:
Even though O’Neal did not wear a NBA uniform during his Pepsi commercial,
one must ask whether the Pepsi-Cola advertising undermined Coca-Cola’s
NBA sponsorship? David Schreff, NBA Properties Vice President of Media
and Sponsor Programs, stated that “[t]hat’s close to an ambush, . . . [b]ut we
respect the rights of our players to go out and secure endorsement.”
96
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(“MLB”)102 and National Football League (NFL)103 teams have
successfully signed their own sponsorship agreements, despite very
vocal complaints from the respective leagues that the team sponsor
was in direct competition with a league sponsor.
3. Distinguishing National Hockey League v. Pepsi-Cola
Canada Ltd. from Tattoo Advertising
The facts of National Hockey League—and the practice of
ambush marketing in general—are readily distinguishable from
prospective tattoo advertising in the NBA. Ambush marketing, as
seen in National Hockey League, may be in some ways
exploitative, but the division between the sport and the marketing
Davis, supra note 60, at 427–28 (citing Geoffrey Brewer, Be Like Nike? Ambush
Marketers Cash in on Major Events without Laying Out Enormous Sponsorship Fees;
Should You Just Do It?, SALES & MARKETING MGMT., Sept. 1, 1993, at 66, 70).
102
The New York Yankees signed a sponsorship contract with Adidas in March 1997,
despite the league’s exclusive sporting goods and apparel sponsorship agreement with
Russell Athletic. Adidas agreed to pay the Yankees $92 million over ten years for the
right to advertise Adidas products in Yankee Stadium and to supply and include the
Adidas logo on the team uniform. Within one year, Adidas’ new North American sales
had increased by sixty-six percent. See Brandon L. Grusd, The Antitrust Implications of
Professional Sports’ League-Wide Licensing and Merchandising Arrangements, 1 VA. J.
SPORTS & L. 1, 6 n.18 (1999) (citations omitted). MLB subsequently failed to sign Nike
or Reebok to a sponsorship deal. MLB owners reportedly turned down a $350 million
deal offered by Nike, complaining that the sum was “paltry.” Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
103
In 1995, the Dallas Cowboys football club signed stadium endorsement agreements
with Nike, Pepsi, Dr. Pepper, and American Express. Through a series of agreements,
the NFL’s licensing division, NFL Properties, had rights to all NFL club trademarks for
commercial purposes, and all licensing revenue would be pooled and distributed equally
to all clubs. NFL Properties filed suit against the Dallas Cowboys Football Club for
circumventing the agreements that obligated the team to share revenue from licensing of
club trademarks. Timothy D. Watson, What’s “Love” Got to Do with It?: Potential
Fiduciary Duties Among Professional Sports Team Owners, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 153, 155
(2002). At the time, Coca-Cola and Visa, competitors of Pepsi and American Express,
were league sponsors of the NFL. Josh Dubow, Not Always Coca Cola, TIME, Sept. 6,
1996 (noting that Coca Cola was a sponsor for the NFL), at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,7201,00.html; David Breitkopf, Visa
Airs Olympics Teaser in Super Bowl Commercial, May 6, 2004 (noting that Visa is a
sponsor for the NFL), at http://www.absolutebrand.com/newz/newz.asp?dismode=article&artid=154). The Southern District of New York ruled that NFL Properties’
allegations were “sufficient to state a cause of action under the broad language of § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act,” but the parties settled, allowing the Dallas Cowboys to keep its
stadium sponsorships and to sign new ones. Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. Dallas
Cowboys Football Club, 922 F. Supp. 849, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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scheme is clear. For instance, in National Hockey League, Pepsi
never entered the playing arena and never used an NHL player to
convey its message.104 With respect to an ambush marketer flying
a banner over an open stadium, it may be even more obvious to the
viewer that the marketer could not enter the stadium and thus was
forced to resort to flying an airplane overhead.105
However, tattoo advertising uses the actual instrumentalities of
the game—the players—to carry and convey the advertisement. A
viewer cannot watch the game on television without also seeing the
tattoo advertisements—all in the same camera shot during live
action. Consequently, there is little physical or visual separation
between the game and the tattoo advertisement. Such close
association between the tattoo advertisement and the league in the
viewer’s eye can create actionable harm to the league’s reputation.
For instance, in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd.,106 actresses in defendant’s pornographic film were
shown wearing uniforms similar to those normally associated with
plaintiff. Asserting a Lanham Act claim based on harm to
reputation, plaintiff argued that film viewers would associate
plaintiff cheerleaders with the pornographic scenes in defendant’s
film as a result of the similarity in costumes. There was no
evidence showing that a substantial number of viewers thought
plaintiff produced, directed, approved or funded the pornographic
film. Nor was there any evidence that a substantial number of
viewers were confused into believing that plaintiff cheerleaders
performed in the film. Regardless, the court found a likelihood of
confusion based on “‘a tendency to impugn (the plaintiff’s
services) and injure plaintiff’s business reputation.’”107
Similarly, in the case of tattoo advertising, the NBA may not
need to show that viewers believe the league formally participated
in or approved the tattoo advertising campaign. The use of a
particularly distasteful tattoo advertisement, or general viewer

104

See generally Nat’l Hockey League, 92 D.L.R. 4th 349.
See generally Bean, supra note 56, at 1099–1103.
106
604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
107
Id. at 204–05 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183,
1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)).
105

VUKELJ

2005]

6/2/2005 2:45 PM

CAN THE NBA PROHIBIT TATTOO ADVERTISEMENTS?

531

aversion to the practice of tattoo advertising,108 could create a
negative association with the NBA. Such harm to the league’s
reputation is actionable.
B. Is a Tattoo Advertising Prohibition Unconstitutional?
The next question is whether the NBA’s concerns in protecting
its image and goodwill can trump the free speech rights of the
players. The players would argue that a ban on tattoo advertising
violates the First Amendment,109 just as a Nevada court reasoned
when it enjoined the Nevada Athletic Commission from banning
tattoo advertising during boxing matches.110 However, individuals
can assert a First Amendment right to free speech only if those
restricting them—i.e., the NBA, an individual team or a state
boxing commission—are considered public entities or state
actors.111 While a state boxing authority, such as the Nevada
Athletic Commission, is likely a “public” entity,112 the relationship
between the state and the NBA and individual NBA franchises is
not as clear.

108

Several commentators have criticized the practice of tattoo advertising in boxing.
See, e.g., Royce Feour, Temporary Tattoos Don’t Belong in Fight Game, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Feb. 23, 2002, at 5C.
109
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances.”).
110
See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text.
111
Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 824 (N.D. Ill. 1998);
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 425–26 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
112
The NAC is a division of Nevada’s Department of Business and Industry. The
Commission was established by act of the Nevada legislature, and it is responsible for
“administer[ing] the State laws and regulations governing unarmed combat for the
protection of the public and to ensure the health and safety of the contestants.” The NAC
internet address (http://boxing.nv.gov) even has a governmental (“.gov”) internet domain
extension. But see S.F. Arts & Ath., Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,
543–44 (1987):
The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does not render the [U.S.
Olympic Committee] a Government agent. All corporations act under charters
granted by a government, usually by a State. They do not thereby lose their
essentially private character. Even extensive regulation by the government
does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into those of the
government.

VUKELJ

532

6/2/2005 2:45 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 15:507

1. Private Actors versus State Actors
The Supreme Court has developed three tests for determining
whether an entity can be considered a state actor: (1) the public
function test; (2) the close nexus test; and (3) the symbiotic
relationship test.113
The public function test considers whether “the private entity
has exercised powers that are ‘traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State,’”114 and whether it performed a function
that traditionally was under municipal control.115 However, merely
performing a function which serves the public is not enough to
make an entity a state actor.116
The close nexus test is concerned with whether the state may
be deemed responsible for the specific actions.117 The complaining
party (i.e., the athlete) carries the burden of showing a sufficiently
close nexus between the state and the challenged action (i.e.,
prohibition of tattoo ads) to establish that the state is
responsible.118 Such a nexus normally will be found only where
the state has coerced the private entity or encouraged it to such an
extent that the private entity’s action “must be deemed that of the
state.”119
Finally, the symbiotic relationship test examines whether “the
state has ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity . . . .’”120 A “combination of
factors”—different in each case—can be used to show that the
state and the private entity have an “interdependent and mutually
beneficial relationship.”121 One element that carries much weight
113

See Karen Martin Dean, Note, Can the NBA Punish Dennis Rodman? An Analysis of
First Amendment Rights in Professional Basketball, 23 VT. L. REV. 157, 159–67 (1998).
114
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
115
Dean, supra note 113, at 160 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966)).
116
Id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)).
117
Long v. Nat’l Football League, 870 F. Supp. 101, 105 (1994) (citing Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
118
Id. (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 104 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
121
Id. (discussing Burton, 365 U.S. 715).
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in the test, though it is not dispositive, is a sharing of profits
between the state and the private entity.122
The NBA should not be considered a state actor under the
public function test. Organizing and operating a professional
basketball league has never been considered a function of the
state.123 Certainly, the NBA performs a public function, and the
state arguably benefits from the presence of the NBA—both in the
overall national economy, and in the revenue each team brings to
its host city. However, the operation of a professional basketball
association is almost entirely a private function.124 Similarly, the
NBA and its member teams should fail the close nexus test. There
is virtually no connection between the state and the NBA
prohibition on tattoo advertising. Nor is there any evidence to
show that the state has pressured or encouraged the NBA in the
formulation of its policy.125 Even the implementation of other
NBA rules and initiatives which could be said to embody
significant state interests—i.e., drug testing—are the result of
league action in conjunction with the Players’ Association, with
little influence or interference from the government.126
One court addressed this very issue with respect to the NFL.127
A former football player sued the NFL, the Pittsburgh Steelers, the
City of Pittsburgh, and the mayor of the city following his
suspension for anabolic steroid use.128 Plaintiff claimed that the
122

Ponce v. Basketball Fed’n, 760 F.2d 375, 377 (1st Cir. 1985).
Goldberg v. 400 E. Ohio Condo. Ass’n, 12 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(arguing in dicta that it is unlikely that the NBA is a government entity for First
Amendment purposes).
124
Id.
125
See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 425–26 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(holding that the federal antitrust exemption, which Congress granted to Major League
Baseball, is not the “‘significant,’ active encouragement required to adequately link
[Major League Baseball’s] actions to the federal government” for First and Fifth
Amendment purposes) (citing S.F. Arts & Ath., Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987)).
126
See, e.g., Mike Wise, N.B.A. Finds Minimal Use of Marijuana in First Tests, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, at D1 (stating that 430 active players were randomly tested for
marijuana, steroids, amphetamines, and LSD in the fall of 1999 pursuant to the league’s
collective bargaining agreement, and that twelve out of the 430 players tested positive for
marijuana).
127
See generally Long v. Nat’l Football League, 870 F. Supp. 101 (1994).
128
Id. at 103.
123
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mayor and the City of Pittsburgh “‘acquiesced and/or consented to,
supported and upheld the conduct of” the NFL and the Pittsburgh
Steelers football team.129 The court rejected plaintiff’s state action
theory under the close nexus test, finding that neither the City nor
the mayor “formulated the standards or controlled the decisions of
the NFL or the Steelers.”130 Rather, plaintiff’s drug suspension
was “based on independent medical conclusions and policy
objectives of the [NFL], neither of which were influenced by the
state.”131
The argument for considering the NBA a state actor under the
symbiotic relationship test is similarly weak. The relevant
question is whether there is a high level of interdependence
between the state and the private entity.132 The interdependence in
this case could be found primarily with respect to basketball
arenas, many of which have received public financing.133 Such
interdependence between the teams and the state involves one of
the most fundamental aspects of the sport—the arenas in which the
teams can play. The very existence of some NBA teams might be
in doubt without public financing. This was the spirit driving the
Stevens v. New York Racing Ass’n134 decision in which the court
found a symbiotic relationship between the state and the New York
Racing Association (“NYRA”), but rejected the existence of a
close nexus between the two entities.135 The lawsuit arose from
the NYRA’s refusal to allow plaintiff, a publisher of a newspaper
about horse-racing, to take or appear in photographs at New York
racetracks.136 The court considered several factors in holding that
the NYRA and the state were interdependent, and thereby in a

129

Id. at 105.
Id.
131
Id. The court continued: “Plaintiff fails to allege that the state in any way influenced
or implemented the substance abuse policies adopted by the NFL by which plaintiff was
suspended.” Id.
132
Id. at 104.
133
Dean, supra note 113, at 166–67 (1998). It should be noted that Ms. Dean suggests
the NBA would be found a state actor under the symbiotic relationship test, due to this
interdependence.
134
665 F. Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
135
Id. at 171–72.
136
Id. at 165.
130
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symbiotic relationship.137 First, the NYRA was formed by the
New York legislature.138 Second, state statute established what
portion of race wagers go to the NYRA.139 Finally, after the
NYRA covered its expenses, the law required it to pay almost the
entire adjusted net income to the state in the form of a “franchise
fee.”140
Closer inspection, however, reveals major differences between
the NBA and NYRA. “[NYRA] was created under a law whose
purpose, in part, was to enable the State to ‘derive reasonable
revenue for the support of government.’”141 Further, “[NYRA] is
merely a conduit through which money passes from the betting
public to the state’s coffers.”142 This level of interdependence is
far beyond that which exists between cities and NBA teams. The
only real similarity between NYRA and the NBA is that they both
govern a sport. If Stevens is to serve as a model for establishing
interdependence between a sports organization and the state, it
would only support the view that the NBA is not a state actor.143
Another case addressing the issue is National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian.144 In a 5-4 majority, the Supreme
Court held that a state university application of National Collegiate
Athletic Association (“NCAA”) rules does not make the NCAA’s
137

Id. at 172, 174–75.
Id. at 168, 172.
139
Id. at 169, 172.
140
Id. at 172.
141
Id. (quoting Halpern v. Lomenzo, 367 N.Y.S.2d 653, 660 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (quoting
N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 9, ¶ 1).
142
Id.
143
But see Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Can Discrimination Law Affect the Imposition of a
Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the National Basketball Association?, 3
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 585, 607 (2001) (using Stevens to show that “if a player can
demonstrate a significant level of government involvement with his NBA franchise, he
may allege an equal protection violation”). However, the author does not detail the
extent of the interdependence between NYRA and the state, and only notes that the
association “received considerable funds” from the state. Id. While the author’s
conclusion is true, it is unlikely an NBA player could meet that burden. The state
essentially takes NYRA’s profits, and the only benefits the state takes from an NBA
franchise, under normal circumstances, are indirect—i.e., via increased local employment
opportunities to support the team and its facility, increased use of public transportation by
fans, taxation, and increased tourism.
144
488 U.S. 179 (1988).
138
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otherwise private conduct a state action.145 The Court noted that
the source of the NCAA rules is not the University of Nevada-Las
Vegas (“UNLV”) or the state of Nevada, but rather the collective
input of the member schools (many of which are state-owned and
operated).146 Ultimately, the Court found that the state did not
“provide[] a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the
harm-causing individual actor.”147 The dissent, however, pointed
out that UNLV, a public university, is a state actor, and its
suspension of Jerry Tarkanian, the men’s basketball coach and a
public employee, constitutes state action.148 Therefore, the dissent
reasoned that, by acting jointly, the NCAA became a state actor.149
Even under the dissent’s rationale, neither the NBA nor its
member franchises should be considered state actors. The decision
to prohibit tattoo advertising is made solely by the NBA, not a
governmental entity. The state might have some involvement in
other aspects of the team, but none that have an immediate impact
on players such that they would perceive the league or team to be a
state actor.
2. Tattooing as Protected Speech
Assuming that the NBA is a state actor, which it likely is not,
another relevant question is whether a tattoo constitutes “speech.”
While it is well-established law that protected speech can include
non-verbal communication, courts have been reluctant to extend
First Amendment protection to tattoos.150 However, as tattoos
have become more mainstream in society, it is conceivable that
they will be considered “speech” for First Amendment purposes
under certain circumstances. Furthermore, up to now most cases
have addressed whether the process of tattooing can be considered

145

Id. at 199.
Id. at 193.
147
Id. at 192.
148
Id. at 199 (White, J., dissenting).
149
Id.
150
See, e.g., Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1253–54 (D. Minn. 1980)
(declining to address whether tattoos are art, and therefore protected by the First
Amendment, acknowledging “the courts are ill equipped to determine such illusory and
imponderable questions . . . .”).
146
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protected speech, as opposed to whether the tattoo itself is
protected speech.
The earliest case addressing tattooing under the First
Amendment is People v. O’Sullivan,151 in which a tattoo artist was
convicted under a New York City law “prohibit[ing] all tattooing
of human beings, except by licensed medical doctors for medical
purposes.”152 The defendant was not a licensed medical doctor and
he was not applying tattoos for medical reasons.153 The court
rejected the defendant’s First Amendment claim, asserting that
tattooing is not “speech or even symbolic speech, . . . and
defendant’s right to engage in tattooing is not paramount to the
public’s right to good health.”154 Ultimately, the court held that
some interference with an individual’s liberty or property is
permissible if public health is at stake.155 This left open the
possibility that tattooing might be considered speech.
The District of Minnesota addressed a similar issue in Yurkew
v. Sinclair,156 in which the Minnesota State Fair Board of
Managers refused to rent space at a state fair to the plaintiff, a
tattoo artist.157 Again, the state argued that tattooing is not
protected by the First Amendment, and that it had an interest in
regulating tattooing due to health concerns.158 The court agreed,
holding that “the actual process of tattooing is not sufficiently
communicative in nature so as to rise to the plateau of important
activity encompassed by the First Amendment.”159 The court
asserted that just because an individual intends to communicate
something does not mean that activity merits First Amendment
protection.160 The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently
151

409 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Term. 1978).
Id. at 333.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
495 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1980).
157
Id. at 1249.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 1253 (citing People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (App. Term 1978)).
160
Id. at 1254; see also Medical Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind.
App. 1986) (citing O’Sullivan and Yurkew to hold that the process of tattooing is neither
speech nor symbolic speech, and thus is not protected by the First Amendment, and
152
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reached the same conclusion in State v. White,161 specifying that
the plaintiff did not show that “the process of tattooing is
communicative enough to automatically fall within First
Amendment protection.”162
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals more directly addressed
the issue of First Amendment protection for tattoos in Stephenson
v. Davenport Community School District.163 In this case, a high
school student was told to remove a tattoo that school
administrators mistakenly thought was a gang symbol.164 In dicta,
the court stated that Stephenson’s tattoo did not merit First
Amendment protection because it “was simply ‘a form of selfexpression.’”165 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court
explained that the threshold question for First Amendment
protection is “‘whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”166
Because Stephenson did not intend any meaning behind the
symbol, the tattoo did not receive First Amendment protection.167
Finally, the court in Riggs v. City of Fort Worth168 muddled the
issue when considering a local police department’s requirement
that an officer cover the tattoos on his arms and legs. Citing
Stephenson and O’Sullivan, the court asserted: “a tattoo is not

further holding that tattooing, whether done for medical or artistic/aesthetic purposes,
must be performed by a licensed practitioner because tattooing is a medical procedure).
161
560 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 2002).
162
Id. at 423.
163
110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997).
164
Id. at 1304.
165
Id. at 1307 n.4 (citing Jt. App. at 63).
166
Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (internal citation omitted))
(alterations in original).
167
Id. The court seemed concerned that this case was not close enough to Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), in which the
Supreme Court held that “black armbands worn by students intended to convey
opposition to Vietnam War constituted ‘silent, passive expression of opinion.’” Id. n.4.
Had the students in Tinker tattooed a black band around their arms, instead of wearing a
cloth armband over their shirtsleeves, the communicative intent would not have been
lessened. Perhaps the expression would have been even more powerful, given the
permanency of tattoos and the financial cost of obtaining one.
168
229 F. Supp. 2d 572 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
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protected speech under the First Amendment.”169 However, the
Riggs court misconstrued the Stephenson and O’Sullivan decisions.
The dicta in Stephenson applied only to the tattoo in that case,
because the tattoo in question was not sufficiently
communicative.170 It did not state that tattoos, by definition, are
unprotected.171 Likewise, the O’Sullivan court addressed whether
the process or act of “tattooing” was protected speech, not whether
a tattoo itself can be considered protected speech.172 Thus, despite
their generally adverse outcomes, the above cases do not contradict
the possibility that tattoos could be considered protected speech
under the First Amendment. Thus far, the cases on the subject
simply do not resolve the issue.173
Further, as tattooing has become more mainstream—especially
among athletes and entertainers—denying First Amendment
protection to all tattoos would be unjustifiable. Tattooing is not
just for gang members, men who ride Harley-Davidsons, or other
assorted so-called “deviants.”174 As NBA forward Jalen Rose
stated in response to the idea of tattoo advertising, “You get a
tattoo about something that’s real dear to you. That’s what makes
169

Id. at 580.
See Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1307 n.4.
171
Id. at 1307.
172
See People v. O’Sullivan, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Term 1978).
173
The case law reveals that courts may have been swayed by anachronistic perceptions
of tattoos. Though it decided the case on other grounds, the O’Sullivan court cited a
lower court decision referring to tattooing as a “‘barbaric survival, often associated with a
morbid or abnormal personality.’” Id. at 333 (quoting Grossman v. Baumgartner, 254
N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (App. Div. 1964)). In addition, the Stephenson case never would have
entered a courtroom—and the plaintiff never would have had surgery to remove her
tattoo—had schoolteachers and police officers not reacted so extremely to an innocuous
tattoo. Several teachers and an officer deemed the tattoo to be a gang symbol simply
from looking at it. See Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1305. Another officer also considered it a
gang tattoo, without ever viewing it. See id. The plaintiff, Brianna Stephenson, was an
eighth grade student, was doing well in her classes, and had no disciplinary problems.
There was no evidence that she was ever affiliated with gangs. Id.
174
See, e.g., Major L.M. Campanella, The Regulation of “Body Art” in the Military:
Piercing the Veil of Service Members’ Constitutional Rights, 161 MIL. L. REV. 56, 98
(1999) (“[People with tattoos] have, in the past, been labeled by American society as the
deviants of society. This label was based primarily on the fact that tattoos were not
traditionally a part of mainstream society. Today, however, tattoos have moved from
being traditionally unacceptable to a more socially accepted form of ‘art.’”) (citations
omitted).
170
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you sit down and go through the process of putting something on
you that will be there the rest of your life. . . .”175 Thus, the issue
of whether tattoos are protected “speech” is yet to be resolved.
Most case law analyzing tattoos under the First Amendment
scrutinize the tattooing process, not the tattoo itself.176
Nevertheless, tattoos could earn First Amendment protection under
some circumstances as they become more mainstream in society.
3. Tattoo Advertising as Protected Speech
Finally, again assuming that the NBA is a state actor, and
assuming that tattoos can constitute speech under the First
Amendment, athletes face yet more hurdles: (a) not all speech
receives the same level of protection under the Constitution, and
(b) even if the speech is generally protected, free speech
protections are more limited in the workplace.
Tattoo advertising is commercial speech, which the Supreme
Court has held merits limited First Amendment protection.177 In
addition, if the NBA is a state actor, it must comply with
employment law free speech standards.178 The most recent major

175

Nance, supra note 32. Rose also added that getting a temporary tattoo advertisement
is “not something I would do.” Id.
176
See supra notes 151–62 and accompanying text.
177
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (“[S]peech is not stripped of First
Amendment protection merely because it appears in [the] form [of paid commercial
advertisements].” (citations omitted). “The existence of ‘commercial activity, in itself, is
no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First
Amendment.’” (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966))); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)
(“[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to
project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another.”). However, the state may
regulate commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading. See id. at 771
(“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own
sake.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961))). Further, the state may impose time, place, and
manner restrictions on expressive activity, whether the location where the expression
takes place is considered a public forum, a forum open to communication, or a forum not
open to communication. See generally Dean, supra note 113, at 169–72 (discussing the
differences between a public forum, a forum open to communication and a forum not
open to communication, and discussing the limits on the state’s ability to regulate).
178
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
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Supreme Court case on this issue is Connick v. Myers,179 in which
the Court affirmed the principle that any restriction on speech by a
public employee must “seek ‘a balance between the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.’”180 The Court went on to say that it must consider the
content, form, and context of the given statement when
determining whether a matter is of public concern.181 It further
narrowed the contours of protected speech in the workplace by
stating that government employers should be granted “wide
latitude in managing their offices” in cases where “employee
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community.”182
Connick limits the free speech claim of an NBA player
significantly. First, the NBA is not a state actor.183 Second, courts
have been slow to recognize tattoos as protected speech or
expression.184 Third, assuming the NBA is a state actor—a
tenuous assumption at best—commercial tattoo advertising is of
minimal “political, social, or other concern to the community.”185
Accordingly, an NBA player challenging the league on tattoo
advertising is unlikely to succeed on First Amendment grounds.
III. MUST THE NBA NEGOTIATE ITS PROHIBITION OF TATTOO
ADVERTISING THROUGH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING?
With the First Amendment analysis weighing against the
players, their best hope for pursuing the right to wear tattoo
advertisements is to try to force the issue into collective
179

Id.
Id. at 142 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
181
Id. at 147–48.
182
Id. at 146; see also Thomas E. Fielder, Keep Your Mouth Shut and Listen: The NFL
Player’s Right of Free Expression, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 547, 571 (2002) (“The
overall effect of Myers was to deny government employees protection for anything other
than political speech.”).
183
See supra Part II.B.1.
184
See supra Part II.B.2.
185
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; see supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text.
180
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bargaining. The players’ union would be in position to bargain on
behalf of all players to gain concessions from the NBA on the
issue. But, like the Lanham Act and First Amendment analyses,
the law here weighs against the players as well. Decisions of the
NLRB and judicial interpretations of what constitutes an “unfair
labor practice” under the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”)186 indicate that the NBA may lawfully establish its
tattoo advertising policy without submitting to collective
bargaining.
Section 8(d) of the NLRA requires that the employer and
representatives of employees meet “and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.”187 In other words, issues pertaining to employee
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”188
are mandatory subject matter for collective bargaining—meaning
the employer and a representative for the employees must bargain
collectively in good faith.189 Employers may refuse to bargain on
all permissive subject matter, which is defined broadly as all
subject matter that is not mandatory—i.e., not pertaining to
“wages, hours, [or] other terms and conditions of employment.”190
A. Tattoo Advertising Income as “Wages”
There is no clear answer to whether the right to wear temporary
tattoo advertising would qualify as mandatory subject matter for
collective bargaining purposes. The practice almost certainly is

186

29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1994).
Id. § 158(d). The relevant portion of section 8(d) of the Act reads:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession.
188
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
189
Id.
190
29 U.S.C. § 158(d); Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm.,
Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
187
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not considered part of the player’s “wages.” As one early ruling
interpreting the NLRA states:
The word “wages,” following the phrase “rates of pay” in
the Act must have been intended to comprehend more than
the amount of remuneration per unit of time worked or per
unit of work produced. . . . This does not necessarily mean
that the word “wages” as used in the Act covers all
satisfactions, pleasures or gratifications arising from
employment such as playing on a company baseball team,
or attending a company picnic, or belonging to a company
social club, although perhaps under some peculiar
circumstances of employment in an isolated plant it might.
Nor does our construction of the word “wages” necessarily
mean that we construe it as covering “real wages” in all the
breadth with which some economists use that phrase.191
Under the W.W. Cross court’s rationale, any argument that the
pursuit of tattoo advertising deals constitutes “wages” will fail.
The fact that the players stand to earn money through tattoo
advertising does not qualify it as a “wage.” Tattoo advertising is,
in essence, exploitation of one’s employment to pursue another
business interest. It is even more tangential to a player’s “wages”
than, for example, attending the company picnic.
B. Tattoo Advertising as “Other Terms or Conditions of
Employment”
The Players’ Association, in challenging the NBA prohibition,
would need to show that tattoo advertising fits under the “other
terms and conditions of employment” umbrella.192 From early in
the history of the NLRA, courts have been reluctant to expand
“terms and conditions of employment.”193 Section 8(d) of the
191

W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
193
See, e.g., Seattle First Nat’l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 32–33 (4th Cir. 1971)
(citations omitted), in which the court stated:
Only as to those matters enumerated in Section 8(d) of the Act is there a
mandatory obligation to bargain under Section 8(a)(5). And, as to those
matters specified in Section 8(d), the phrase ‘terms and conditions of
employment’ is to be interpreted in a limited sense which does not include
192
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NLRA “does not say that the employer and employees are bound
to confer upon any subject which interests either of them; the
specification of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment defines a limited category of issues subject to
compulsory bargaining.”194 There must be a strong connection to
employee wages or hours for the employer action to be considered
a mandatory bargaining subject.195 The tattoo advertising scenario
does not come close enough to wage, free agency, salary cap,
revenue sharing,196 or other employment issues197 that have been
found to be mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.198 As one
recent court held: “In general, ‘only issues that settle an aspect of
the relationship between the employer and employees’ are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. An issue arising from outside
the bargaining unit may be a mandatory subject of bargaining if it

every issue that might be of interest to unions or employers. A mere remote,
indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient.
194
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542, 546 (1967) (quoting Justice
Stewart’s concurrence in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 220–21,
223–24 (1964)).
195
Id. at 547 (recognizing “a legal distinction between those subjects which have a
material or significant impact upon wages, hours, or other conditions of employment, and
those which are only indirectly, incidentally, or remotely related to those subjects”).
196
Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that
“[m]inimum individual salaries [of NBA players,] fringe benefits, minimum aggregate
team salaries, and guaranteed revenue sharing” are mandatory subject matters of
collective bargaining under the NLRA).
197
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the
NFL’s “Rozelle Rule,” which required “inter-team compensation when a player’s
contractual obligation to one team expires and he is signed by another . . . [and which]
operates to restrict a player’s ability to move from one team to another and depresses
player salaries,” is a mandatory subject matter for collective bargaining under the
NLRA).
198
But see McKelvey, supra note 59, at 25. The author argues that a prohibition on
tattoo advertising would need to be collectively bargained. However, despite stating that
“[n]umerous decisions of the [NLRB] . . . strongly indicate that a league rule prohibiting
the ability of a player to wear temporary tattoos would be viewed as a ‘condition of
employment,’” the author cites just one case. That case held that a change or revision in
the dress code without collectively bargaining with the employees’ union is a violation of
§ 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. Transp. Enters., 240 N.L.R.B. 551, 560 (1979); see also
Kaminski v. Chrysler Corp., 983 F. Supp. 1128, 1134 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (“[E]mployee
work rules, especially those leading to disciplinary action, are subject to mandatory
collective bargaining.”).
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‘vitally affects’ the terms and conditions of employment within the
bargaining unit . . . .”199
Furthermore, as stated in Justice Stewart’s concurrence in
Fibreboard Products Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board:
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as
imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such
managerial decisions, which lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control.
Decisions concerning the
commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of
the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about
conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision
may be necessarily to terminate employment.200
Using Justice Stewart’s reasoning, the NBA would merely be
seeking to preserve the contractual relationships it already has with
numerous sponsors, and to protect the NBA brand and the league.
These business interests, while perhaps not geared toward
preventing the immediate downfall of the league, serve the longterm goal of preserving goodwill with sponsors. The fact that
players are adversely affected by a tattoo advertising ban does not
necessarily mandate collective bargaining.
It would be to the players’ benefit if the NBA based prohibition
of tattoo advertising on the notion that tattoo advertisements are
demeaning to the athlete or that they create an unsavory work
environment for players. Such arguments would only draw
attention to the issue as one concerning the well-being of athletes
in the “workplace,” and thus, an issue that must be collectively
bargained as a “term or condition of employment.”201 By framing
the issue in terms of the business interests of the league, the NBA
would distance itself from players’ rights issues, and avoid the
appearance of paternalism with respect to employees.
199

Pall Corp. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 116, 119–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted;
emphasis added).
200
379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Mark M. Rabuano, An
Examination of Drug-Testing as Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining in Major
League Baseball, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 439, 446–57 (2002) (discussing mandatory
and permissive subjects of bargaining, and arguing that drug testing must be a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining).
201
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
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CONCLUSION
In the opinion of the marketing executive who attempted to
launch tattoo advertising in the NBA: “[Tattoo advertising] is
going to happen. It’s really just a matter of when.”202 He may be
correct in saying that a player will attempt a tattoo advertising
campaign. If your local baseball radio broadcasters have already
agreed to mention an auto insurance company every time the home
team completes a double play, can a “Dunkin’ Donuts” basketball
bicep billboard be far behind? The league, however, is likely to
prevail. The NBA has real economic incentives to oppose tattoo
advertising, and, as a private actor, would be immune to a
constitutional challenge.

202

Walker, supra note 2.

